Court of Appeals Holds Live-In Girlfriend Not Entitled to Death Benefits

By: Bryan L. Cantley

The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed a 1950s Supreme Court decision holding that a woman cohabitating with a married man is not entitled to death benefits under the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act.  West v. Hoyle’s Tire & Axle, LLC, ___ N.C. App. ___, 857 S.E.2d 856 (2021).

Keith West was killed in a work-related accident while working for the defendant-employer.  West’s adult daughter, adult son, estranged wife, and Shannon Stocks – plaintiff’s “alleged girlfriend or fiancé” – all asserted death benefit claims.  Stocks acknowledged that she was not married to West, but claimed she was cohabitating with and partially dependent upon him for certain expenses.

At a hearing before a Deputy Commissioner, West’s family members moved to dismiss Stocks’ claim and requested an award of attorneys’ fees and sanctions against Stocks.  The Deputy Commissioner granted the motion to dismiss and issued an award of attorneys’ fees against Stocks.

Stocks appealed to the Full Commission, and the decision was affirmed with respect to Stocks’ standing to assert a claim for death benefits.  The Full Commission also determined that Stocks’ pursuit of death benefits did not amount to “stubborn, unfounded litigiousness” and was instead a good faith argument to change appellate precedent.  The Full Commission therefore reversed the Deputy Commissioner’s Order with respect to attorneys’ fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered whether the family members were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and whether the Industrial Commission’s holding denied Stocks equal protection of the law.

The family members asserted that Stocks brought her claim “without reasonable ground,” as the issue of dependency of a live-in girlfriend was controlled by Fields v. Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 78 S.E.2d 740 (1953).  The Court observed that it was bound by the 1953 holding in Fields. 

In Fields, the Supreme Court held that a woman cohabitating with a married man could not prove factual dependency under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-39.  That statute provides that a widow, widower, and/or a child “shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support on the deceased employee.”  The statute further states that “in all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part shall be determined in accordance with the facts as the facts may be at the time of the accident.”

Stocks argued that she should fall into the category of “all other cases,” allowing her to prove her factual dependency.  In Fields, the Supreme Court specifically held that a woman who was “living in unlawful cohabitation with an employee at the time of his death” could not be entitled to compensation under the “in all other cases” language of § 97-39.  

In reaching its decision, the Fields Court examined the language of § 97-39 to effectuate the legislature’s purpose of ensuring swift and certain payment of death benefits to defined beneficiaries without the risk of protracted litigation.  The Fields Court stated that a contrary holding “would be alien to the customs and ideas of our people,” “would shock their sense of propriety and decency,” “would tend to impair the public estimate of the sanctity of the marriage relation,” and “would place ordained matrimony on the same level with common lasciviousness.” 

The Court of Appeals noted that the parties did not dispute that the principle of stare decisis would operate to bar Stocks’ argument regarding her entitlement to benefits.  Nonetheless, the Court held that Stocks’ argument was a “good faith argument for reversal of the existing law in Fields.” 

On the issue of equal protection, Stocks argued that Fields’ interpretation of § 97-39 impermissibly delineates between classes of individuals based on their marital status.  The Court of Appeals held that because it was bound by the decision in Fields, they were “without authority to revisit it until otherwise ordered to do so by the Supreme Court.”

Stocks recently filed a Petition for Discretionary Review to the Supreme Court, which remains pending as of the date of this blog post.